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INTRODUCTION 
Some objects, like Weebles and lawn darts, resist inversion. 
The same is true of certain popular legal theories—or so we argue. 
In this Essay, we explain what it means to “invert” a theory, why 
one would want to do such a thing, and why it might be difficult 
to accomplish. 
I.  WHY AND HOW TO INVERT A THEORY 
Suppose a compelling theoretical model embeds a critical as-
sumption that is extremely implausible or patently false.1 Two re-
sponses predominate. One is to ignore the assumption’s falsity 
and embrace the theory anyway. The other is to reject the theory 
outright. But there is a third alternative: using a theory’s radi-
cally unrealistic assumptions to “invert” it. This approach allows 
scholars to draw lessons from the theory—indeed, sometimes the 
very ones that the theorist originally had in mind—by turning the 
spotlight on the implications of the untrue assumptions. 
A well-known example of (mostly successful) inversion 
involves the Coase Theorem, which in its popular formulation 
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 1 See Dani Rodrik, Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science 
27 (Norton 2015) (explaining that “an assumption is critical if its modification in an argu-
ably more realistic direction would produce a substantive difference in the conclusion pro-
duced by the model”). 
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holds that if transaction costs are zero, an efficient result will 
always be reached regardless of the initial allocation of 
entitlements.2 The zero transaction cost assumption is, of course, 
wildly unrealistic—a fact Ronald Coase emphasized from the 
outset. 3  A different and better way to articulate the Coase 
Theorem is to invert it: because transaction costs are positive, the 
initial allocation of entitlements can (and typically does) matter 
to efficiency.4 This rearticulation puts the emphasis where Coase 
himself did. Although the popular or “uninverted” form of the 
Coase Theorem still receives a lot of play, law and economics 
scholars seem well attuned to the significance of the zero 
transaction cost qualification.5 
There are other popular theoretical models that are equally 
good candidates for inversion that have not been successfully in-
verted to date. Below, we discuss four such theories: Robert 
Nozick’s entitlement theory of distributive justice, the Tiebout 
Hypothesis, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s principle of tax 
superiority, and the Prisoners’ Dilemma. The persistence of the 
uninverted, popularized forms of these theories is puzzling, and 
we explore some possible reasons for it. First, though, we spell out 
how inversion works, using the Coase Theorem as an example. 
A. Conditions for Inversion 
There are three basic ingredients that make a theoretical 
model suitable for inversion. First, it must contain strong and un-
realistic critical assumptions. Second, it must have generated a 
widely shared popular understanding with a simple normative 
 
 2 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960). 
George Stigler named the Theorem, not Coase himself. George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Price 113 (Macmillan 3d ed 1966). 
 3 Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 15 (cited in note 2). 
 4 For example, Mitchell Polinsky defines “the more complicated version of the Coase 
Theorem” as follows: “If there are positive transaction costs, the efficient outcome may not 
occur under every legal rule.” A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 
15 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed 2011). See also Deirdre McCloskey, The So-Called Coase 
Theorem, 24 E Econ J 367, 367 (1998) (“Economists have gotten the ‘theorem’ wrong; in 
fact, backwards.”); Steven G. Medema, HES Presidential Address: The Coase Theorem 
Lessons for the Study of the History of Economic Thought, 33 J Hist Econ Thought 1, 4–5 
(2011) (providing different versions of the Coase Theorem, including an inverted one from 
McCloskey). 
 5 The field of new institutional economics, for example, centers on transaction costs. 
See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J L & Econ 233, 233 (1979) (“The new institutional economics is preoccupied 
with the origins, incidence, and ramifications of transaction costs.”). 
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prescription that hinges (wittingly or not) on the truth of the un-
realistic assumptions. Third, confronting the falsity of the as-
sumptions generates an inverted version of the original theory 
that replaces this normative prescription with a quite different 
one. For the Coase Theorem, we can state these core ingredients 
as follows: 
TABLE 1:  INVERTING THE COASE THEOREM 
Popular  
Understanding 
Bargaining Produces Efficiency  
Regardless of Legal Entitlements 
Unrealistic  
Assumption Zero Transaction Costs 
Inverted Version Law Matters to Efficiency 
 
We revisit these same three components as we work through 
our other examples below. 
B. Inversion and Alternatives 
Inversion, as we use the idea, tracks the creation of an in-
verse in logic.6 For the Coase Theorem, we start with this categor-
ical if-then statement: 
If transaction costs are zero, an efficient result will always be 
reached regardless of the initial allocation of entitlements. 
The popularized version of the Coase Theorem downplayed the 
“if” clause and instead suggested that the balance of the sentence 
would hold true across a range of real-world conditions. To repo-
sition emphasis on the untrue assumption, we form this inverse: 
If transaction costs are not zero, an efficient result will not 
always be reached regardless of the initial allocation of enti-
tlements. 
Or more succinctly: when transaction costs are positive, the ini-
tial allocation of entitlements can matter to efficiency. 
Inverting a theory differs from most other forms of critique in 
that it grants (at least for purposes of discussion) everything 
claimed by the theory except the false assumption under scru-
tiny.7 To be sure, one can undermine or challenge theories in 
 
 6 See Alfred Tarski, Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive 
Sciences 39–40 (Oxford 4th ed 1994) (Jan Tarski, ed). 
 7 For a similar approach, see Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 
Syracuse L Rev 75, 87 (1991) (describing “[f]lipping” as “appropriating the central idea of 
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other ways short of outright attack. For example, a theory’s 
punchline might be watered down by introducing exceptions and 
qualifications.8 Or competing narratives might be attached to the 
theory’s central framework in an effort to broaden or challenge its 
takeaways.9 Another alternative to inversion effectively applies a 
warning label to the theory, stressing that it should not be applied 
to situations in which the specified assumptions do not hold. Yet 
a proviso that effectively tells readers, “Don’t try this at home—
or, actually, anywhere else in the real world,” invites disregard of 
either the warning or the theory. Inversion offers a third way, one 
that turns analytic attention on the implications of the false  
assumptions. 
II.  THEORIES RIPE FOR INVERSION 
There are no doubt numerous theories that are good candi-
dates for inversion, and we hope this Essay will prompt scholars 
to identify more of them. 10  We focus here on four examples: 
Nozick’s entitlement theory of distributive justice, the Tiebout 
Hypothesis, Kaplow and Shavell’s theory of tax superiority, and 
the Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
A. Nozick’s Theory of Distribution 
In his 1974 book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 11  Nozick 
worked out a theory of a minimal or “night-watchman” state that 
would largely limit its interventions to protecting citizens against 
force and fraud, and that would not involve itself in redistribu-
tion.12 This hands-off approach to distributive issues is rooted in 
 
your opponent’s argument-bite and claiming that it leads to just the opposite result from 
the one she proposes”). 
 8 See generally, for example, Jeremy K. Kessler and David E. Pozen, Working Them-
selves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U Chi L Rev 1819 (2016) (arguing 
that prescriptive legal theories tend to become increasingly complicated and compromised 
as they mature). 
 9 See, for example, Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordi-
nation, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S Cal L Rev 209, 218–25 (2009); Wayne Eastman, Tell-
ing Alternative Stories: Heterodox Versions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the Coase Theorem, 
and Supply-Demand Equilibrium, 29 Conn L Rev 727, 740–41 (1997). See also generally 
Carol Rose, Game Stories, 22 Yale J L & Humanities 369 (2010). 
 10 We have already learned of an additional theory that has been inverted or “re-
versed” in past work. See generally Michael S. Knoll, The Modigliani-Miller Theorem at 
60: The Long-Overlooked Legal Applications of Finance’s Foundational Theorem, 36 Yale 
J Reg Bull 1 (2018) (discussing the “reverse” Modigliani-Miller theorem of capital struc-
ture irrelevancy). 
 11 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books 1974). 
 12 See generally id. 
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Nozick’s “entitlement theory” of distributive justice, which as-
serts that the legitimacy of a society’s distribution does not de-
pend on the patterns of resources that people end up with, but 
rather on the processes through which people come to hold those 
resources.13 A just distribution would result, according to Nozick, 
if certain unrealistic conditions were met—specifically, if all ac-
quisitions and all subsequent transfers satisfied principles of jus-
tice in acquisition and transfer, or if any injustices in acquisition 
or transfer were fully rectified.14 
Both critics and fans of Nozick’s work viewed it as an apology 
for free-market distributive results and as a basis for ending re-
distributive programs targeted at the poor.15 The claim that a 
properly understood theory of distributive justice eschewed any 
particular pattern was viewed as a defense of existing inequali-
ties. Yet Nozick’s entitlement theory endorses a pure market dis-
tribution only if everyone’s holdings came about from combina-
tions of just acquisition and just transfer (or if there has already 
been proper rectification for any injustice in holdings). 
Of course, the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer 
have been violated in dramatic and systematic ways. In the 
United States, for example, today’s pattern of property holdings 
reflects a history that includes settlement by conquest; chattel 
slavery; property and contract restrictions on women; the acqui-
sition of family fortunes by fraud, bribery, and other criminality; 
government corruption and discrimination; and private discrimi-
nation. Nor has there been anything resembling full rectification 
for these injustices. Even Nozick regards the validating assump-
tions of his entitlement theory of distributive justice as so pa-
tently false as to make it impossible to use the theory to criticize 
any actual instances of redistribution.16 
What happens, then, if we invert the theory? Suppose we ac-
cept Nozick’s idea that the justice of a distribution depends on its 
history but reject the claim that our particular history gives peo-
ple morally justifiable entitlements over their current holdings. 
The principle of rectification would flip the advice about the 
state’s role in addressing distribution. Instead of, “If all past hold-
ings and transfers were just (or have been fully rectified to the 
 
 13 Id at 150–60. 
 14 Id at 150–82. 
 15 See, for example, Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, Is Nozick Kicking 
Rawls’s Ass? Intellectual Property and Social Justice, 40 UC Davis L Rev 563, 564 (2007) 
(“Robert Nozick stands as one of the foremost intellectual antagonists to claims for dis-
tributive justice.”). 
 16 See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 231 (cited in note 11). 
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extent they were unjust), then the current distribution is just,” 
the proper lesson is, “Because not all past holdings and transfers 
were just (and the injustices have not been fully rectified), the 
current distribution is not just.”17 
Flipping the theory carries both backward-looking and  
forward-looking implications. Although unwinding each specific 
injustice is impossible, systematic past injustices that are re-
flected in current distributive patterns would, on this account, 
call for distributive interventions that are motivated by the im-
perative to rectify—in at least a rough way—the past injustices 
that the current patterns reflect. 18  Looking forward, Nozick’s  
theory suggests that it matters how people come to possess the 
things they have. Some processes of distribution draw tighter con-
nections between desert and payoffs than others: compare, for ex-
ample, a decontextualized cash transfer with a living wage. If the 
history of holdings bears on the justice of holdings, as Nozick sug-
gests, then distributive policy should be sensitive not only to cre-
ating distributive patterns but also to building distributive histo-
ries that link payments with rationales.  
  
 
 17 Or as Hal Varian puts it, the reality of past injustice demands that rectification 
be treated not as “somehow minor” but rather “central to the issue of justice.” Hal R. 
Varian, Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and the Theory of Fairness, 4 Phil & Pub 
Aff 223, 227 (1975). 
 18 Nozick himself suggests as much. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 230–31 
(cited in note 11). Indeed, Nozick observes that even a Rawlsian approach to distributive 
justice could potentially follow from his entitlement theory, although he notes this “may 
well be implausible.” Id at 231. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 78–83 (1971) (describ-
ing the “difference principle,” which holds that social and economic inequality is permissi-
ble only to the extent it improves the position of the least advantaged). Entitlement theory 
might lead to that distributive approach, Nozick explains, if, “lacking much historical in-
formation,” we make the following two assumptions: 
(1) that victims of injustice generally do worse than they otherwise would and 
(2) that those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest prob-
abilities of being the (descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who 
are owed compensation by those who benefited from the injustices (assumed to 
be those better off, though sometimes perpetrators will be others in the worst-
off group). 
Nozick, Anarchy State, and Utopia at 231. This caveat, however, is not part of the popular 
understanding of Nozick’s minimal state. 
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TABLE 2:  INVERTING NOZICK’S ENTITLEMENT THEORY 
Popular  
Understanding Redistribution Is Unnecessary 
Unrealistic  
Assumptions 
Past Justice in Acquisition and Transfer  
(or Full Rectification) 
Inverted  
Version 
Past Injustice Makes Redistribution  
Necessary 
B. The Tiebout Hypothesis 
Charles Tiebout wrote A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures19 
as a rejoinder to the then-conventional academic view, articulated 
by Richard Musgrave and Paul Samuelson, that governmental 
provision of goods and services is inherently inefficient due to in-
tractable problems of demand revelation. 20  Tiebout recognized 
that, in a multijurisdictional metropolitan area, “consumer- 
voters” can select among local governments.21 If each local govern-
ment offers a different mix of goods and services, along with as-
sociated tax burdens, the person who is choosing where to live can 
be analogized to a shopper who is selecting among different bas-
kets and price points—if certain highly unrealistic assumptions 
hold, including perfect knowledge, perfect mobility, no con-
straints associated with employment (all people are assumed to 
live on dividend income), and no spillovers among jurisdictions.22 
The theoretical point, which came to be known as the Tiebout 
Hypothesis (TH), was a powerful one: it showed how entry and 
exit could substitute for a price mechanism and reveal 
information about preferences as residents “vote with their feet.” 
In legal academia, TH is broadly associated with the positive 
claim that people sort into the communities that suit them best 
and that the communities shape themselves to compete for 
consumer-voters. This corresponds to a normative claim: that 
local governments should have autonomy so as to induce optimal 
sorting.23 The popular version of TH thus holds that each local 
 
 19 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J Polit Econ 416 (1956). 
 20 See generally id.  
 21 See id at 418. 
 22 See id at 419–20. 
 23 See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 
Minn L Rev 503, 503 (1997) (“The dominant law and economics model of local government, 
based on the work of Charles M. Tiebout, assumes that decentralization of power to local 
governments promotes the efficient delivery of public goods and services.”); Nestor M. 
Davidson and Sheila R. Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 UC Davis L Rev 63, 
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government must remain free to set its own policies (including 
exclusionary land use policies) without restraint so that people—
people with perfect mobility, that is—can sort into their preferred 
communities. 
These prescriptions crucially hinge on the untrue assump-
tions that Tiebout used in constructing what he described as an 
“extreme model.”24 Significantly, Tiebout saw sorting as a means 
to an end: it is through the process of sorting into communities 
that people register their preferences for different goods and ser-
vices. But the quality of the information that is revealed through 
this process is only as good as real-world conditions permit. Every 
barrier to mobility, every obfuscation of information about  
services and costs, and every externality that attenuates the  
connection between what is paid and what is received makes  
location choices that much less revealing. Treating sorting as the 
relevant end gets things backwards and ignores the artificiality 
of Tiebout’s central assumptions. 
Suppose that we invert the theory to restore the original em-
phasis on demand revelation. The flipped version of TH suggests 
that impediments to mobility and extrajurisdictional impacts of 
local policies scramble the implicit price signals sent by moves 
and that it is necessary to correct these distortions. An inverted 
TH thus looks for ways to improve the conditions of mobility for 
everyone, increase awareness of the extrajurisdictional implica-
tions of local policies, and address interdependencies among com-
munities so that the implicit price signals sent by moves are ac-
curate ones.25  This means examining the ways in which local 
governmental policies impose costs on other local governments, 
such as through exclusionary housing policies. More foundation-
ally, it means focusing attention on how all households can be 
given meaningful choices among local jurisdictions. 
  
 
73 (2013) (“[S]cholars regularly invoke the Tiebout model to support arguments for 
devolution and decentralization.”). 
 24 Tiebout, 64 J Polit Econ at 419 (cited in note 19). 
 25 Tiebout himself suggests as much when he notes the allocative efficiency benefits 
of “[p]olicies that promote residential mobility and increase the knowledge of the 
consumer-voter.” Id at 423. 
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TABLE 3:  INVERTING THE TIEBOUT HYPOTHESIS 
Popular  
Understanding 




Perfect Mobility and Unconstrained 
Choice; No Spillovers among Communities 
Inverted  
Version 
Unconstrained Local Autonomy  
Distorts Self-Sorting 
 
C. Kaplow and Shavell’s Theory of Tax Superiority 
Kaplow and Shavell famously modeled the advantages of con-
ducting all redistribution through tax and transfer (hereinafter 
“tax”) rather than through legal rules.26 Moving money through 
the tax system is well known to produce distortions in the choice 
between labor and leisure.27 However, Kaplow and Shavell ar-
gued that redistributive legal rules would embed an equivalent 
labor-leisure distortion, but would also distort choices about the 
primary behavior that is being regulated.28 Kaplow and Shavell 
accompanied this formal vision of tax superiority with policy ad-
vice that has become associated with the popular understanding 
of their work: that welfarists should ignore the distributive con-
sequences of legal rules and conduct all redistribution through 
tax alone.29 
 
 26 See generally Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the 
Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 
J Legal Stud 821 (2000); Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Dis-
tortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 Natl Tax J 513 (1996); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, 
Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 
J Legal Stud 667 (1994); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in 
Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 
71 Am Econ Rev 414 (1981). A key antecedent in the economics literature was A.B.  
Atkinson and J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation, 6 
J Pub Econ 55 (1976). Although Kaplow and Shavell qualify their claim of tax superiority 
in a number of respects, they note that “these qualifications involve subtle refinements 
that are tangential to the ordinary view concerning how legal rules might be adjusted to 
increase redistribution, namely, to favor the poor at the expense of the rich.” Kaplow and 
Shavell, 29 J Legal Stud at 834–35. 
 27 See Atkinson and Stiglitz, 6 J Pub Econ at 56–57 (cited in note 26) (explaining 
that a tax system will inevitably produce distortions when the characteristic upon which 
the tax is based, such as income, lies under the individual’s control). 
 28 Kaplow and Shavell, 23 J Legal Stud at 667–68 (cited in note 26). 
 29 See id at 677. We term this claim “prescriptive tax superiority” and distinguish it 
from “formal tax superiority,” which focuses only on Kaplow and Shavell’s formal result. 
See Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Eco-
nomics, 100 Minn L Rev 1051, 1058–69 (2016). 
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This prescriptive claim has become dominant in law and eco-
nomics.30 But it depends on a core unrealistic assumption—that 
political impediments to redistribution are insensitive to the 
method of redistribution. Critics of Kaplow and Shavell’s theory 
have often noted that redistribution through tax may be politi-
cally infeasible31 but have rarely focused on Kaplow and Shavell’s 
rejoinder: that any political impediments to redistribution 
through the tax system will also block, to an equal extent, efforts 
to redistribute through legal rules.32 This claim—that the amount 
of redistribution cannot be altered by the choice of distributive 
method (“distributive invariance”)—is false.33 For many reasons 
we have previously explored, it may be more difficult politically 
to move money through the tax system than through a substan-
tive legal rule.34 If one can get different distributive results by us-
ing legal rules instead of or in addition to tax, tax will not always 
be the exclusively preferred method. 
Suppose we approached the theory of tax superiority with an 
appreciation for the fact that political costs can vary among 
modes of distribution—that is, with an understanding that the 
assumption of distributive invariance is false. Instead of, “If the 
pattern of distribution is invariant to the means of redistribution, 
then it is always optimal to address distribution only through tax 
(and not through other legal rules),” we get, “Because the pattern 
of distribution varies with the means of redistribution, it is not 
always optimal to address distribution only through tax (rather 
than through other legal rules).” Inversion highlights the im-
portance of studying the political barriers to redistributing 
through different modes, similar to the focus on transaction costs 
that followed Coase’s theoretical breakthrough. 
  
 
 30 See, for example, Fennell and McAdams, 100 Minn L Rev at 1062 n 32 (cited in 
note 29) (collecting citations); Kyle Logue and Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: 
Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 Tax L Rev 157, 158 (2003). 
 31  See, for example, Fennell and McAdams, 100 Minn L Rev at 1074 n 69 (cited in 
note 29) (collecting citations).  
 32 See, for example, Kaplow and Shavell, 23 J Legal Stud at 675 (cited in note 26).  
 33 See Fennell and McAdams, 100 Minn L Rev at 1079–1109 (cited in note 29) (de-
fining the term “distributive invariance” and demonstrating its implausibility). 
 34 See generally id. For additional discussion of why distributive changes are not off-
set, which is one way in which distributive invariance fails, see Zachary Liscow, Is Effi-
ciency Biased?, 85 U Chi L Rev 1649, 1664–66 (2018). 
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Ignore Distributive Implications of  
(Nontax) Legal Rules 
Unrealistic  
Assumptions 
Political Impediments Are Insensitive to 
the Method of Redistribution 
Inverted  
Version 
No Redistributive Routes Should Be  
Ruled Out 
 
D. The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) is an application of game the-
ory that has been widely used by legal scholars. Unlike the above 
examples, there is no explicit normative theory of the PD, but 
from many specific uses, we can articulate what has become an 
implicit theory.35 
In the vivid story from which this abstract game gets its 
name, a prosecutor creates a PD by making each of two prisoners 
the same offer (and ensuring that the prisoners have common 
knowledge that the offer is made to both of them): “If you both 
confess, I will give you both a lenient sentence of three years in 
prison; if you both remain silent, I have evidence to convict you 
only of a minor crime and you will each serve one year in prison; 
if one of you confesses, and the other remains silent, the confessor 
will walk free while the nonconfessor will get no leniency and 
serve seven years.” Here is the decision matrix that the prisoners 
confront, as it is typically presented: 
  
 
 35 A vast literature across many domains of law makes use of the PD. As one of us 
previously reported, a 2009 Westlaw search in the Journals & Law Reviews database for 
“prisoner’s dilemma” or “prisoners dilemma” (which also retrieves “prisoners’ dilemma”) 
resulted in 3,119 documents. McAdams, 82 S Cal L Rev at 214 n 14 (cited in note 9). 
Westlaw appears to have changed its libraries slightly, but the same search in the Law 
Reviews & Journals database more recently (on October 14, 2018) retrieved 4,828 docu-
ments. Nine articles just since 2012 contain the term “prisoner’s dilemma” or “prisoners’ 
dilemma” in the title. Scholars have applied the PD to many legal areas, including con-
tracts, corporate law, banking, international law, the federal judiciary, and civil discovery. 
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TABLE 5:  PRISONERS’ DILEMMA (PAYOFFS FOR ROHN, COLIN) 
 Colin Remains  
Silent 
Colin Confesses 
Rohn Remains  
Silent 
(−1, −1) (−7, 0) 
Rohn Confesses (0, −7) (−3, −3) 
 
Rohn does best to confess if Colin confesses (getting three 
years rather than seven) and best to confess if Colin remains si-
lent (getting zero years instead of one). Colin is in exactly the 
same position: he does best by confessing no matter what Rohn 
does. Thus, both prisoners confess (“defect”) and do three years in 
prison, though they would both gain if they could both remain si-
lent (“cooperate”) and receive one year. This “both defect” predic-
tion is driven by the particular assumptions built into the struc-
ture of the game. Far from being treated as an odd puzzle that 
might arise under rarified circumstances, however, the PD game 
and multiplayer versions of the PD game have been widely used 
in legal theory, by law professors and political scientists, to build 
a normative case for legal intervention.36 
At its core, the PD is widely understood to justify the use of 
law to solve problems of cooperation.37 First, the PD shows that 
cooperation is impossible because the dominant strategy is to de-
fect. Second, the PD shows that legal sanctions can “solve” the 
problem of cooperation in a way that makes everyone better off. 
But these twin predictions—that the PD players will defect rather 
than cooperate and that a resolution exists that will make every-
one better off—depend on demanding assumptions that are rarely 
true in combination. 
As a general matter, game theory assumes that the players 
are perfectly rational and perfectly self-interested. The classic PD 
game further assumes a one-shot game with a peculiar payoff 
structure that makes joint defection dominant but that would also 
deliver mutual gains to the parties if joint cooperation could be 
achieved. This follows from the way that both of the players are 
deemed to subjectively rank the options open to them: defecting 
while the other player cooperates is best of all and cooperating 
 
 36 See, for example, McAdams, 82 S Cal L Rev at 214 nn 15–22 (cited in note 9)  
(collecting citations). 
 37 Some have previously dissented from what we describe here as the popular view. 
See generally id. See also Eastman, 29 Conn L Rev at 740–41 (cited in note 9). 
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while the other player defects is worst of all, even though mutual 
cooperation has a higher payoff than mutual defection. 
In contrast to the PD’s assumptions, most real-world situa-
tions have both winners and losers, even when solving a collective 
action problem. Moreover, when two individuals engage in an in-
definite repetition of PD interactions, cooperation can and does 
emerge.38 Indeed, even people who are actually in a one-shot game 
are often uncertain that the game will ultimately prove to be one-
shot, or they may fear broader reputational sanctions that trans-
fer across one-shot interactions. There are many other ways that 
reality can diverge from the model’s assumptions. For example, 
the knowledge that another player might become angry at one’s 
selected strategy (even if the other player cannot retaliate) could 
alter the perceived payoffs in a real-world setting and change the 
PD into a different game entirely.39 
Thus, the complete, defining set of PD assumptions is rarely 
true. Consider the implications. First, if the assumptions that col-
lectively suggest people cannot cooperate are rarely fully met, law 
may be necessary for cooperation much less frequently than is 
usually supposed. We might focus instead on how to ensure that 
the conditions for cooperation exist. This is what Elinor Ostrom’s 
work did with respect to the multiplayer version of the PD, the 
Tragedy of the Commons: she explored how real-world communi-
ties sharing a depletable common-pool resource can maintain it 
at sustainable levels without resort to law.40 
Second, the popular theory suggests that legal intervention 
is uncontroversially justified because solving the PD creates only 
winners. In fact, we must almost always decide how to trade off 
gains against losses, winners against losers. One reason is that 
the defect/defect outcome may not be worse for everyone than  
cooperate/cooperate. A consumer of a common-pool resource who 
has an attractive outside option may prefer to jointly deplete the 
resource rather than to cooperate to maintain it; this person is 
made worse off by limits on consumption. Yet even if everyone 
potentially gains from cooperation, there is almost always more 
than one way to cooperate, and the choice of how to cooperate may 
controversially involve differing distributional consequences.41 To 
 
 38 See generally Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books revised 
ed 2006); Charles Holt, Cathleen Johnson, and David Schmidtz, Prisoner’s Dilemma Ex-
periments, in Martin Peterson, ed, The Prisoner’s Dilemma 243 (Cambridge 2015). 
 39 See McAdams, 82 S Cal L Rev at 226–28 (cited in note 9). 
 40 See generally Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institu-
tions for Collective Action (Cambridge 1990). 
 41 See McAdams, 82 S Cal L Rev at 228–30 (cited in note 9). 
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prevent overfishing a common lake, for example, one might coop-
erate by limiting either the size of fishing boats or the days of 
fishing. If the fishers who already have big boats prefer to limit 
the days of fishing, while those with the smallest boats (who need 
to fish every day to support themselves) prefer to limit boat size, 
a normative conflict remains. 
Inverting the implicit theory of the PD game pushes us to 
recognize that cooperation failures are not inevitable, but distrib-
utive disagreement is (nearly) inevitable. 
TABLE 6:  INVERTING THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
Popular  
Understanding 
Legal Intervention Is Necessary and  
Improves Payoffs for Everyone 
Unrealistic  
Assumptions 
Mutual Defection Is Everyone’s Dominant 
Strategy but Mutual Cooperation Yields 
Higher Payoffs for All Parties 
Inverted  
Version 
Legal Interventions Are Rarely Necessary 
for Cooperation and Rarely Improve  
Payoffs for Everyone 
III.  WHY ARE UNINVERTED THEORIES SO STICKY? 
As we have shown, inverting a theory is different from reject-
ing it. The theory inverter sees something valuable in the theory’s 
internal logic and the connections it makes, despite the lack of 
alignment between the theory’s supporting assumptions and re-
ality. She then works to extract and apply that lesson in a manner 
consonant with real-world conditions. 42  Put this way, the ap-
proach sounds useful, even compelling. Why then do popular  
uninverted theories have such staying power? The Sections below 
take on this question from two angles: first by considering how 
inversion can fail or misfire, and then by examining the appeal of 
uninverted theories. 
 
 42 Although we focus here on specific theories rather than broader methodological 
approaches, we note a parallel between inversion and the rise of behavioral law and eco-
nomics in response to the traditional rational actor model. Significantly, behavioral law 
and economics accepts the premise that regularities in human behavior can form the basis 
for predictions and hence for policy, but diverges from the rational actor model as to the 
content of those regularities. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redis-
tributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand L Rev 1653, 1654 (1998). 
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A. Inversion Trouble 
We can start by observing that inversion is not an especially 
popular mode of scholarly engagement. It is easy to understand 
why. Inversion requires approaching an established theory with 
an awkward combination of admiration and criticism. The in-
verter grants enough of the initial theory to alienate the theory’s 
usual critics, yet the inversion itself irritates the theory’s support-
ers. Indeed, the original theorist may assert that the inverter is 
attacking a straw man, if the theory initially made explicit the 
assumptions on which it depended. Why harp on the fact that a 
theory depends on its own stated assumptions or proclaim (as if 
it were news) that the theory doesn’t work if the assumptions are 
not true? Popularizers, for their part, have long since stopped 
thinking about the unreality of the assumptions on which the the-
ory’s normative takeaways hinge and are unlikely to relish re-
minders on this score. As a result, inversion efforts may fail to 
change the scholarly discourse—or may not be undertaken at all. 
This Essay hopes to promote inversion as a valid and useful 
mode of analysis, one that adds value through both critical and 
constructive moves. The critical move involves delinking the for-
mal results of a theory that depends on false assumptions from 
the normative prescriptions associated with that theory. Put 
simply, assumptions that are false in policy-relevant ways cannot 
be the basis for prescribing anything.43 The constructive move is 
to use the theory’s core insights to develop a normative analysis 
that takes seriously the falsity of the theory’s assumptions. Con-
sider how these two elements worked together in what is perhaps 
the most successful inversion to date, that of the Coase Theorem. 
Even though Coase himself emphasized the existence of positive 
transaction costs, a popular view of “Coaseanism” that made law 
irrelevant had to be upended in order for transaction costs to take 
center stage. This cleared the way for what became a rich and 
influential vein of scholarly innovation. 
But inversion carries risks. Indeed, as one of us has argued 
in other work, the Coasean inversion did not get things quite 
right.44 Transaction costs have been turned into objects of scorn, 
 
 43 We refer here to assumptions that are essential to the prescriptions, not ones that 
are peripheral. See Rodrik, Economics Rules at 27–29 (cited in note 1) (distinguishing crit-
ical assumptions from those that are not essential to the conclusions). See also id at 213 
(“Unrealistic assumptions are OK; unrealistic critical assumptions are not OK.”). 
 44 Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 Harv L Rev 1471 (2013). 
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things to be attacked and minimized.45 In fact, they represent just 
one way in which access to resources might be blocked once we 
move away from a zero transaction cost world. Focusing on only 
one way of improving that access is a mistake. Among other 
things, it might cause us to pour too many of our resources into 
reducing transaction costs.46 Likewise, efforts to attain the ideals 
of absolute justice in acquisition and transfer, perfect mobility, 
invariant political action costs, and Pareto-efficient solutions to 
intractable collective action problems may be impossible or pro-
hibitively costly. Inversion does not dictate focusing solely on 
those objectives. We can—and should—think broadly and crea-
tively about alternative ways to confront the false assumptions at 
the heart of the respective theories. 
A final concern about inversion is whether scholars might 
press it into service to serve an agenda of some kind. Readers may 
note that three of our examples47 involve theories that, in popular 
form, are associated with politically conservative messages and 
that, in inverted form, support more politically liberal messages. 
But the inversion template could be applied to all sorts of theo-
ries, including ones that are associated with politically liberal 
takeaways, as the example of the PD shows.48 We hope that this 
Essay will prompt others to find their own favorite candidates for 
inversion. Nonetheless, certain kinds of uninverted theories may 
be especially likely to take root, notwithstanding their false as-
sumptions. The next Section considers why that might be. 
B. What’s the Attraction? 
Our examples show considerable success of theories in what 
we call their uninverted form. Why do theories become—and  
remain—popular in this implausible form instead of the more 
plausible inversion? It is not hard to understand why both the 
consumers and producers of theories would be attracted to strong, 
 
 45 See, for example, Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J L & Econ 141, 
161 (1979) (“[I]n the theory of externalities, transaction costs are the root of all evil.”). 
 46 See Fennell, 126 Harv L Rev at 1501–02 (cited in note 44). 
 47 See Parts II.A–C. 
 48 See Part II.D. See also Eastman, 29 Conn L Rev at 732 (cited in note 9) (presenting 
alternative narrative versions of familiar models, including the Coase Theorem and the 
PD, “that have different moral and political implications from the canonical accounts but 
that accord with and illustrate the models’ logical twists equally well”). Albert Hirschman 
makes an analogous observation about the theories that he uses to illustrate the rhetorical 
patterns of “futility, perversity, and jeopardy” and discusses how liberal theories might 
employ similar patterns. Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futil-
ity, Jeopardy 149–63 (Belknap 1991). 
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counterintuitive normative takeaways. In academic theorizing, 
fortune favors the bold. People are more likely to notice a theory, 
and to find ways of using it, when it appears to demonstrate deci-
sively some startling result. In all the cases we discuss, the unin-
verted theories are bolder than the inverted ones precisely be-
cause they minimize the apparent significance of questionable 
assumptions. This makes them fun to discuss and easy to propa-
gate. What is perhaps more perplexing is how false assumptions 
gain the staying power necessary to keep theories uninverted 
even when they make no sense that way. 
One possibility is that certain kinds of assumptions, like 
those paired with mathematical models, require some degree of 
engagement and deciphering before debunking is possible, some-
thing that many critics may not be in a good position to do. It’s 
also possible that attacking assumptions is simply a more com-
mon strategy in some lines of discourse than others. For example, 
our anecdotal sense is that it is common to respond to a stereo-
typically liberal argument by first granting the goal (for example, 
helping the poor) and then suggesting that the proposed approach 
(for example, rent control) will actually work at cross-purposes 
with that goal because a crucial assumption is false (for example, 
that supply will remain unchanged). Such a “grant the goal” ap-
proach may be a less common response to more stereotypically 
conservative positions. But more data points are necessary to de-
termine if there is a systematic ideological skew in this regard. 
Second, we believe there is a certain resilience to theories 
that exist in inverted form for the true expert and mostly in  
uninverted form for the academic nonexpert. Because the theorist 
concedes somewhere that the assumptions limit the exciting im-
plications, the expert can assure the nonexpert that the theory is 
valid, even while the popular nonexpert audience embraces and 
deploys the theory in uninverted form. At least in our experience, 
the casual reader often takes confidence in the fact that experts 
they trust endorse the theory, without absorbing that the en-
dorsement is as carefully framed by the same unrealistic assump-
tions as the original theory. This effect may give the uninverted 
theory remarkable resilience. 
Third, and potentially most importantly (albeit most specu-
latively), we detect a theme common to all four uninverted theo-
ries we review, a possible common reason for their popularity. 
The theories appear to resolve or avoid otherwise intractable dis-
tributive disagreements, enabling scholars to set distribution 
aside in conducting their own analyses. Most legal academics are 
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interested in questions about what the law should be, yet norma-
tive analysis is difficult to get off the ground when the ground 
itself embeds deep distributive controversies. 
Nozick’s theory demonstrates that the existing distributional 
pattern in a society need not matter to justice (if each step leading 
to each current property holding was just). Tiebout shows that 
local autonomy produces useful competition that satisfies con-
sumer demand (if people are mobile enough, and there are no 
spillovers among jurisdictions). Kaplow and Shavell enable legal 
academics to ignore intractable distributional issues whenever 
they are discussing legal topics other than tax (if the resulting 
distribution will be the same regardless of the method of redistri-
bution). The PD reveals a situation in which all affected parties 
benefit from government intervention to coerce cooperation (if the 
situation is exactly a one-shot PD with no distributional issues in 
how to cooperate). In each case, the theory offers a novel and  
counterintuitive means of breaking a potentially paralyzing nor-
mative impasse. 
What about the Coase Theorem, which has enjoyed parallel 
lives in popular and inverted form? Perhaps its successful inver-
sion can be explained by the fact that Coase himself worked very 
hard to debunk the popularized version of the theory and press 
forward his original point.49 Perhaps the legal academy was also 
more open to receiving the inverted message because, unlike the 
other examples we have provided, inversion did not reopen any 
sealed-off distributive questions. Neither the popular nor the  
inverted version of the Coase Theorem has anything to say about 
distribution—both look only at efficiency. If our supposition is cor-
rect, inversion will be most difficult to achieve—but perhaps most 
important to achieve—when it requires giving up the extraordi-
narily useful illusion of a distribution-free foundation for legal 
analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Categorical, counterintuitive theories are attractive. But 
they can also mislead. When theories rely on patently false as-
sumptions, ignoring the assumption’s falsity means missing the 
point. Yet to reject such a theory, root and branch, is to discard a 
valuable route to insight. The theory inverter seeks instead to 
identify and preserve what is useful in the theory’s internal logic 
 
 49 See, for example, R.H. Coase, The Firm the Market and the Law 13, 174  
(Chicago 1988). 
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and in the connections it makes. In this way, inversion can turn 
false assumptions into fulcrums for useful scholarship. Under-
standing why there might be aversion to such inversions can help 
clear the way for this promising approach.  
